Hollow Lakedaimon

Reconciling the Storm of Spears with the Press of Shields

2011-07-27T13:25:00.000-04:00

I've just written a long article on the mechanics of hoplite battle for the Marathon Special issue of Ancient Warfare magazine (http://www.ancient-warfare.com/cms/ancient-warfare/guidelines/editorial-plan-2.html). I will be in good company, because the editors have secured articles by some of the top thinkers on ancient Greek warfare, like Krentz and Sekunda.

My article, which I think will have the final title, "The mechanics of hoplite combat: reconciling storm of spears with press of shields", is a bit over 6,000 words and crammed with many of the concepts I discuss on this blog. The goal of the article is to reconcile the increasingly divergent views of the "orthodox" and "heretical" views of hoplite combat. If you've been reading, then you know that I believe most of the differences evaporate once we understand the mechanics of masses of men in motion. The heretics in general don't understand how men could survive a physical push by all ranks, while the orthodoxy does not present realistic mechanics for men doing so. Were it not for the fact that they both veer away from their fields of expertise and into mine, I would have nothing to add to the discussion. But because they do, often making assertions that they are unqualified to make, I have an opportunity to bring about syncretism. To paraphrase Dr. Krentz, I have no expectation that my recommendations will be followed, but the argument should reach a larger audience now.

One thing that I have done in this article is to update the presentation of the crowd-othismos from my 2007 article. In that earlier article I specifically presented the new form of othismos as a counter to the prevailing orthodoxy. Because I wrote within the paradigm of the orthodoxy, the earlier article left the impression that battles had to start with a collision. In this article, I have shown what I have discussed on this blog for some time, that the physical collision of men more likely occurred after a period of spear-fighting. This is because the density of the crowd is far more important to the transmission of force than the speed of advance. Hence the storm of spears, then press of shields all formed part of the experience of most hoplite battles. Often, one side gave way "at spear's length" before othismos, and sometimes I believe there was an initial collision, as during the second phase of Coronea, "a battle like no other", but the threat of both phases of battle was always present.

I haven't posted for a while, but I have been banking up information. Once the article comes out, there will be a flurry of posts to provide supporting material. I have many diagrams I did for the article that will find their way into posts.

So, check back over the next month or so because things will heat up.

"Reinstating the Hoplite": Adam Schwartz and the failure of the orthodox view of othismos

2010-11-09T17:48:00.000-05:00

A few months back, I promised a review of Adam Schwartz's "Reinstating the Hoplite: Arms, Armour and Phalanx Fighting in Archaic and Classical Greece". In this post I am going to specifically address Section 3.4, Othismos. I’ll restate that this book is a remarkable resource. If you own only one book on hoplite combat, own this one. Much of the book is a filtering and restatement of arguments put forth in a series of papers that make up the great “Heresy-v-Orthodoxy” debate, meticulously footnoted. If you have read all of these papers, then much of this book will not seem novel, but it is nice to have all of this in one place and Schwartz’s commentary is often quite insightful. His description of othismos is a weakness of the book.

This section begins with a description of othismos as “a common effort, ostensibly by a common push…of the entire phalanx…into the enemy in order to drive them back”, following Hanson’s usage. I agree with this definition and we will need to keep it in mind as we go forward, for Schwartz deviates from it in important ways in his presentation. Following the prevailing notion, which you now know to be incorrect if you have been reading my previous posts, he goes on to describe men hoplites in othismos:

The hoplites in the front stemmed their left shoulder against their shield and thrust it against the shields and bodies of the enemy with all their might; and the ranks behind them in turn stemmed their shields against the backs and right side of the man in front in a ¾ stance, as it were.

In this way, a tremendous pressure could be generated and conveyed through the entire phalanx from the rearmost rank, its force increasing on the way.

Right away, Schwartz has unwittingly presented us in these two sentences with contradictory mechanics. This is the most glaring problem with the current portrayal of othismos, and the focus of my campaign to correct our understanding. You cannot both stand at a “¾ stance” and sustain “tremendous pressure”. A ¾ stance is one in which your body is held at a diagonal behind the shield, which is facing flush to your foes. The arm is bent, with the arm and body forming an acute angle. This is the natural stance for just about all combat sports, from Asian martial arts to renaissance fencing. Hoplites probably stood this way when engaged in spear fencing. I will do a full post on stances and weapons grips used in hoplite combat at a later date, but for now it is important to understand that in this pose, the only thing holding the shield away from the front of your body is the strength of your arm and shoulder. Were I to grab you by the right shoulder with one hand and the shield with the other and try to force your shield to touch your chest, it is easy to see that very little of your musculature resists my pushing.

Now, even the biggest weight lifter cannot resist “tremendous pressure” with the strength of his arm and shoulder alone. Remember that less than 10 men can generate 1,000 lbs of force or more. So if we take the description of men at ¾ and apply anything approaching the force that can be generated by files of hoplites, the end result will be that the hoplites collapse into the bowl of their shields, chest to underside of the shield rim. Once they collapse into the shield in this way, they occupy less space than they did in the ¾ stance. Thus, as the file closes in there is no room to move back into ¾ stance again unless the files spreads out.

This is important because the current orthodoxy posits a stance with the left shoulder inside the bowl of the shield, pushing on the inner shield-face. Many have interpreted Arrian, the Roman tactician, describing this in a section of his Tactica (16.13). Arrian of course was not a hoplite and the passage in question does not exist in earlier sources for his tactia. He did on the other hand live at a time when Romans formed shield-walls, later called a fulcum, wherein men with very different, single gripped, shields may well have pushed standing sideways at far lower pressure than a hoplite with an aspis could survive.

If we toss out the ¾ stance when pushing, then we can also eliminate the notion that the depth of the aspis was to allow the shield to be rested on the shoulder while pushing. I won’t go on here, but look back to my previous posts to learn how hoplites stood with their shields and a further examination of why the “shoulder rest” function was a side benefit and not the purpose for the depth.

At 3.4.2, the book moves on to describe arguments for and against a literal othismos defined as above. This section is a good distillation of the various viewpoints, but in rebutting the opinions against othismos, Schwartz goes awry. He specifically addresses two arguments: 1) the tremendous force generated by deep files of men would cause a squeeze that would be “distressing to contemplate” in Fraser’s words (1942), and 2) the great pressure would impede weapons usage.

Schwartz is failed here by his reliance on Franz (2002). I must be clear that Franz wrote in German, a language I do not read, so I am only commenting on Schwartz’s translated quotations from that work. With that in mind, what is attributed to Franz shows a lack of understanding of how force is generated in groups of pushing men. He is quoted as writing:

The mass pressure was not achieved by the weight of the warriors, but by their muscles…the mass of the hoplites played a relatively minor role. It came into play chiefly when brief, thrusting impulses were transmitted from one warrior to another.

Schwartz focuses on this and tells us that it “corrects a common enough oversight in the othismos debate.” In fact, Franz, via Schwartz, is propagating a misunderstanding of crowd forces while at the same time being represented as an authority on the subject. Mass is the most important factor in transmitting forces through dense crowds. It is through “leaning” and resting your weight on the man in front, more than “pushing with the legs” that force adds cumulatively in crowds. Members of crowds stand for the most part upright and lean into each other with the upper body angled to some degree. The amount of pressure that can be generated in pushing with the legs is restricted by the angle the legs make with the ground- the closer to perpendicular the less pressure you can generate, with an optimal angle at something acute like 45 degrees depending on how well your feet grip the substrate.

This is important because, as we have seen in crowd data that I presented previously, high pressures within crowds can be maintained for long periods of time. It is in fact the duration of pressure even more than the sheer amount that causes asphyxia in crowds. So, contra Schwartz, the pressure in ranks of hoplites would be “impossible to resisist” without an aspis to protect the diaphragm. His mention of armor as protection against asphyxia, even if true (some reenactors of ECW push of pike battles tell me that the breast and back does help) becomes problematic when we consider the rise in the era of deepest ranks of the organic corslet, sometimes called “tube and yoke” or linothorax.

Schwartz further quotes Franz about what occurs in crowds:

When people behind sense that the pushing does not bring about any immediate advantage, they stop pushing. The result is a kind of reverse thrust.

This statement shows a fundamental difference in a “crowd” of pedestrians and a “crowd” of hoplites in othismos. The hoplites want to generate lethal levels of forces, while crowds do so only accidentally. If we start from the definition of othismos presented at the beginning of this post, then the goal of opposing ranks is to produce the maximum pushing force that they can. What he describes is true for pedestrian crowds, and this behavior is also why we don’t see othismos in every other battle-line in history. Once the front of the file gets squeezed to their limit, they push back on their own men, causing the file to open. In hoplites this did not happen until the pressure became enormous because of their ability to withstand being squeezed without suffocating.

An analogy to what happens between men in Franz’s depiction would be you walking down a hall and pushing against a closed door. If the door does not open, you stop pushing, the feedback telling you it is locked. But if you know the door is locked and your goal is to break down the door, then you do not stop pushing even when the same exact feedback tells you it is locked. You push harder in order to bust it opened. This is what hoplites did. Their “crowds” were meant to push against resistance and overcome it.

Schwartz touches upon this in mentioning crowd disasters, but does not connect the crowd of hoplites to the type of crowd that ends in deaths from asphyxia because he cannot describe why hoplites could survive this. My own examination of the aspis’s role in protecting against crushing of the diaphragm can. There is no reason to expect a group of motivated pushing hoplites to be “like any other crowd moving in a particular direction.” They are intentionally attempting to generate the maximum sustained force against their opponents, and could generate sustainable forces far in excess of those which occur accidentally in crowds of similar size.

A bit further on, he discusses that othismos could not last long. This has been an objection of many: “How can you push for an extended period?” The answer again comes from an understanding of crowds. Pressure can be maintained within crowds at rock concerts for long periods. Force will vary over time, but not in the quick oscillations Schwartz envisions. There could be "lulls", the force reducing as men simply unpack to catch their breath, perhaps even pulling completely apart and engaging at spear range again.

At the end of this section, following the prevalent notion of hoplites charging directly into othismos, he brings up the fact that many units charge, even when occupying positions of superior height. He portrays them as abandoning tactical advantage for momentum. I won’t dwell on this, but Polybios specifically describes the problem with not charging downhill during the battle of Sellasia (2.68), and it has nothing to do with momentum for othismos.

The second objection he addresses is that weapons cannot be used in othismos. He quotes Cawkwell’s statement that men would “better be able to use their teeth than their weapons”. I’ve addressed this at length, and I was glad to see that Schwartz also saw the utility of the short sword in the press of othismos. He correctly sees the limitations of the spear in othismos and presents the overhand grip as the exclusive strike for use within the phalanx as well. I’ll delve into that deeper in a future post.

He also does a great job of showing the folly of van Wees’s notion that the aspis cannot be used to push because it was held up at a slant and only the bottom rims would collide. Obviously, the men would simply collapse into their shields as they push and Schwartz points this out. Unfortunately, he did not see that this same logic applies to men standing at ¾ stances as I described above.

He also twists Xenophon (Cyr. 7.1.33) to mean that the aspis was rested on, not against, the shoulder. The clear reading of the passage is that the shield was rested against the shoulder/upper arm, and this can certainly be read as a description of the way I portray hoplites as resting the rim against the front of the shoulder, on the broad shoulder piece of the organic corslet. Note that some depictions show these stiff shoulder pieces extending wider than the shoulder, so if you push with the shield on the shoulder the stiff pad gets jammed into your neck!

Section 3.4.3 is an examination of the morale effects of added ranks, which are in no way incompatible with othismos, but works alongside it. In 3.4.4, he discusses the need to maintain cohesion. Goldsworthy’s notion of depth as a means of maintaining cohesion in the presence of broken terrain is mentioned, but as I have shown previously, there is no record of 25 or 50 rank phalanxes deploying from this depth into a shallower, broader line. Unless these men are meant to stand idle until the front ranks somehow break through, getting more men into the area is not helpful unless they can move to a shallower formation and engage the enemy.

He describes the Argive predilection to run too early into the charge and notes that this tore holes in the formation between them an adjacent units. Interestingly, he goes on to describe Spartans foregoing the charge, but does not seem to realize that this too must result in gaps between them and adjacent units that did have a running charge. The whole line cannot have arrived simultaneously against the enemy line if part walked and part ran. This has been overlooked by everyone to my knowledge.

Following the common model of othismos, he mentions hoplites charging 50 m (later 20-25m) in order to impart “a maximum of penetration power at the collision”. The real cause of the charge has more to do with the “tremendous nervous pressure” he also describes, because it takes only a few yards to achieve the “ramming speed” suggested by the orthodoxy. Any distance in excess of that simply causes fatigue and a loss of cohesion for no gain of momentum. In fact, the whole notion of a charge like an un-horsed medieval knight imparting maximum pressure is a fallacy, as I have previously demonstrated. Dense packing is far more important for a strong and sustainable force even if it occurs at slow speed.

It is in the final section, 3.4.5, that Schwartz’s portrait of othismos falls apart. He again draws on “observations of crowd behavior” to portray othismos as a “phenomenon occurring at intervals”. He applies what I is think a wildly inappropriate reference on Spartan leaders having trouble keeping the rear ranks from pushing forward to initiate the charge to show that rear ranks could push forward when locked in combat. I do believe that they did push forward within the file, but this reference cannot be applied. Cavalry were famous for “chomping at the bit” to rush into the charge as well, but there is not corresponding push when engaged in combat. Using an innapropriate reference gives ammo to the foes of othismos.

Inexplicably, he abandons the ¾ stance, where men push their shields into the back of those in front, for Luginbill’s “T” shaped, side-on stance where men push into the side and right shoulder of those in front. Then he has the file leaders being propelled into the enemy ranks by the file behind them “killing left and right”. Far more likely is getting “killed from left and right”. More importantly, the overlapping of shields within each succesive rank make any single file pushing through the stacked ranks and out of formation, then into the enemy’s overlapped ranks, unlikely.

He states that: “Such othismos may have occurred in short bursts, and at random intervals, as the rear ranks felt they might help their comrades by applying pressure. And not all 7 ranks need to participate in shoving simultaneously…” This is a radical departure from Hanson's “a common effort, ostensibly by a common push…of the entire phalanx…into the enemy in order to drive them back”. In fact, what he goes on to describe is nothing unique to hoplites. Romans and pretty much any linear formation in ranks surely had disorganized pushing by eager men behind the front ranks. This interpretation makes “othismos” so common in the history of warfare that it hardly warrants a special term in the Greek context. This commonality also goes a long way towards unraveling all of the arguments for the form of the panoply being derived from the need to be effective in the “push”. Any Roman with a scutum could do what Schwartz advocates and frequently did.

Part of the problem is that Schwartz is in a bit over his head. I do not say this disparagingly. I applaud him for attempting to bring in concepts from crowd mechanics even if he ultimately does not sufficiently understand them. A statement that hoplite battles were “essentially chaotic” is ironic, because I agree with him, but my understanding of chaos is clearly far different from his own. The phrase “no one to direct the movements of the enormous organism” is so close to what I believe the truth, but we need to add an understanding of how order emerges from seemingly ‘chaotic’ interactions within groups. The study of how this occurs through what is called self-organization will ultimately yield a clearer understanding of hoplite combat. Groups of men, like flocks of birds or schools of fish, can achieve a great degree of cohesion and coordination through simple interactions between men in a bottom-up fashion, and do not require the top-down direction of generals for much of what occurs in combat. Thus, we do not need “a referee with a whistle” as Holladay (1982) said would be needed to move from one phase to another. Such “phase transitions” can arise simply from the interactions of individual hoplites in the absence of specific orders.

Sword use in Othismos

2010-10-25T23:23:00.001-04:00

In an earlier post, I wrote that hoplites in the crowd of othismos could strike with short swords over their shields into the necks of their foes in a truly brutal manner. I happened to find an image that shows what this strike would have looked like and where it would have been delivered. Obviously the artist is not depicting othismos, but the arm position of the hoplite and the insertion point, along side the neck into the chest cavity(but on the left), are similar.

The (mis-)understanding of Xenophon's fictional battle of Thymbara

2010-10-04T17:05:00.004-04:00

There is a section of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia that is often invoked as evidence against the occurrence of Othismos in hoplite combat and to demonstrate the uselessness of deep files in such pushing matches. It occurs during the fictional battle of Thymbara and the lines seem pretty clear when read in isolation:

Xenophon, Cyropaedia 6.3.20
“And how are the Egyptians drawn up?” asked Cyrus; “for you said ‘with the exception of the Egyptians.’”
“The brigadier-generals drew them up—each one ten thousand men, a hundred square; for this, they said, was their manner of arranging their order of battle at home.
22] “And do you think, Cyrus,” said one of the generals, “that drawn up with lines so shallow we shall be a match for so deep a phalanx?”
“When phalanxes are too deep to reach the enemy with weapons,” answered Cyrus, “how do you think they can either hurt their enemy or help their friends?
23] For my part, I would rather have these1 hoplites who are arranged in columns a hundred deep drawn up ten thousand deep; for in that case we should have very few to fight against. According to the depth that I shall give my line of battle, I think I shall bring the entire line into action and make it everywhere mutually helpful

Xenophon surely knew what he was talking about when it came to hoplite battle and he clearly states the uselessness of such depth. Reading this section alone, I would have a hard time supporting a notion of othismos that brings the force of deep files to bear.

But there is more a bit further on that rarely gets cited along with the above:

Xen. Cyrop. 6.4.17 The infantry that you will fight against, you have fought before—all but the Egyptians; and they are armed and drawn up alike badly; for with those big shields which they have they cannot do anything or see anything; and drawn up a hundred deep, it is clear that they will hinder one another from fighting—all except a few.
Well, here again he reiterates the uselessness of great depth in a phalanx, But…

18] But if they believe that by rushing (ὠθοῦντες) they will rush us off the field, they will first have to sustain the charge of horses and of steel driven upon them by the force of horses; and if any of them should hold his ground, how will he be able to fight at the same time against cavalry and phalanxes and towers? And that he will have to do, for those upon our towers will come to our aid and raining their missiles upon the enemy will drive them to distraction rather than to fighting.
The translator has chosen the word “rush”, but you may recognize the root of Othismos in the actual word used (in bold), thus “push” and “pushed” (or perhaps crowded). Xenophon is clearly stating that the deep phalanx can push his shallow Persian phalanx from the field. The reason he is confident it will not happen is his use of combined arms against it. The first two ranks of the Persians simply have to slow the Egyptian advance while the rear ranks rain down missiles (Interestingly this is a similar mechanic to both the actual Persian tactics and the later Roman Fulcum). He even has set towers on the field to shoot down into the ranks while his cavalry is supposed to hit them in the flank and rear before they can in fact push the Persians from the field.

As he describes it, the battle plays out in just this fashion:

Xenophon, Cyropaedia 7.1.33] Here, then, was a dreadful conflict with spears and lances and swords. The Egyptians, however, had the advantage both in numbers and in weapons; for the spears that they use even unto this day are long and powerful, and their shields cover their bodies much more effectually than corselets and targets, and as they rest against the shoulder they are a help in shoving. So, locking their shields Together, they advanced and showed.
34] And because the Persians had to hold out their little shields clutched in their hands, they were unable to hold the line, but were forced back foot by foot, giving and taking blows,
So here the Persians get the worst of doratismos, but eventually are “pushed” back by a line of locked shields that are better designed for physical pushing, until…

until they came up under cover of the moving towers. When they reached that point, the Egyptians in turn received a volley from the towers; and the forces in the extreme rear would not allow any retreat on the part of either archers or lancers, but with drawn swords they compelled them to shoot and hurl. 35] Then there was a dreadful carnage, an awful din of arms and missiles of every sort, and a great tumult of men, as they called to one another for aid, or exhorted one another, or invoked the gods.
36] At this juncture Cyrus came up in pursuit of1 the part that had been opposed to him; and when he saw that the Persians had been forced from their position, he was grieved; but as he realized that he could in no way check the enemy's progress more quickly than by marching around behind them, he ordered his men to follow him and rode around to the rear. There he fell upon the enemy as they faced the other way and smote them and slew many of them.
The Egyptians are surrounded and ultimately surrender.

To understand this passage, we need to look not only to the context within this book, but to Xenophon’s recent experience. He wrote this book after the Theban 50 rank phalanx at Leuctra and most likely after the 50 rank phalanx at Mantinea as well. These extra deep phalanxes had made resistance in othismos against them futile. In effect, these are the ultimate expression of othismos, but also very vulnerable.

The Thebans had been experimenting with deep phalanxes since at least Delium, where Pagondas formed 25 ranks deep in order to force his way through the Athenian phalanx. They habitually formed in more than 16 ranks and apparently violated a treaty during the Corinthian war designed to force them into a maximum of 16 ranks so as to lengthen the allied battle-line and avoid being flanked by the Spartans. We don’t know the depth at Tegyra, but perhaps the Sacred band did not need extra depth against a foe who erroneously allowed them to break through their battle-line because they assumed the Thebans were attempting to escape the field. They may have had the second phase of Coronea in mind, where Xenophon chided Agiselaos for the bloody battle that ensued when he headed off a retreating Theban formation (probably 25 ranks deep). At that battle they broke through the Spartan center eventually as well, but were spent and routed.

The culmination of all of these experiences with depth was the Theban 50 rank phalanx at Leuktra/ Leuctra. It was not a “column”, as is often stated, any more than a 16 rank taxis was a column, but something like an 80 by 50 rectangular taxis. Hoplites did attempt to engage from marching column on occasion and things did not go well. The 50 rank taxis at Leuctra and Mantinea proved unstoppable, but in no way simply steam-rollered the Spartans from the field. The mechanics of pushing en mass require this to be a slow process and problems of packing within the ranks of each phalanx and moving in unison ensure that there could be a give and take of ground of the type that we read about in accounts of the battles. But a ratcheting advance of the great Theban mass was always likely to win in the end.

Xenophon knew all of this and as an astute general could see the weakness of the extra-deep phalanx to flanking maneuvers and the inability of missile troops to shoot over the deep mass effectively. Thus he does not attempt to do more than slow the Egyptian (Theban) phalanx, while shooting into the mass with missiles both from the rear ranks and down from mobile field fortifications. I’m tempted to think he would have presaged the Spartan tyrant Machanidas’ use of artillery against the phalanx had he not set his book in the Persian past. While he is slowing and distracting them, his cavalry envelops them from the rear and secures victory.

The obvious weakness of the ultra-deep phalanx to flank attack rendered the whole tactic something of a trick that was impossible to carry out against a forewarned and properly armed foe. Already at Mantinea it is possible that the death of Epameinondas was no accident of battle, but indicative of the Spartans hitting the unsupported right flank of the Theban formation. Their inferiority in cavalry compared to the Boeotians rendered outflanking around the left flank unlikely. I generally follow Plutarch’s version of the death of Epameinondas where he is killed by a Spartan sword, but Ephorus, via Diodorus, has him felled by javelins. If there is any truth to the latter it perhaps reflects a Spartan mirror (precedent?) of the thinking of Xenophon’s fictional tactics.

Helena Schrader and revolting Helots

2010-09-20T12:18:00.000-04:00

Recently, a friend of mine, Helena Schrader, who has written many novels set in ancient Sparta with an eye towards dispelling much of the mirage that has been built up around Spartan history, asked me a question on something I posted on her website. I decided to turn her question into a guest spot, giving you both her initial question and my response. Many of you have already followed the link from my site her hers, and I recommend those that have not done so take the opportunity now. She has a new trilogy coming out centered on Leonidas's life.

I mentioned a Helot revolt in 490 BC that may have been the real cause for the Spartan delay that left Athens to face the invasion alone. Her question was as follows:

“What evidence is there for a helot revolt in 490? I have heard it hypothesized that there might have been a helot revolt to explain Sparta's delay in responding to the Athenian plea for assistance against the Persian invasion. But I was not aware of any literary or archeological evidence that supported this thesis. On the contrary, I recently read an account that stressed that no other explanation for the Spartan delay than the one reported by Herodotus (6:106) (waiting for the full moon) was needed. Personally, I have been speculating about another possible reason for the delay - Cleomenes' madness and an internal dispute about who should lead the Spartan army sent to aid Athens. The kings were supposed to command, and Leotychidas does not appear to have been active - or trusted? - as a commander. Cleomenes was going mad - or possibly still in Arkadia. I think internal disagreement about who to put in command might have made it impossible for the Spartans to react promptly, but the desire to keep internal disputes secret made them give the Athenians the excuse of a religious festival. Any way, if you have some strong indicators for the helot revolt, however, I'd be very interested.”

There is one direct reference to a revolt of Helots in 490BC. Plato (Laws 698 D-E) includes the line:

“but when they sent out embassies in every direction to seek aid, all refused, [698e] except the Lacedaemonians; and they were hindered by the war they were then waging against Messene, and possibly by other obstacles, about which we have no information, with the result that they arrived too late by one single day for the battle which took place at Marathon.”

Now, Plato has something of a reputation for paying more attention to his Rhetoric tutors than his history lessons, so of itself his statement is less than compelling. There is a whole suite of circumstantial evidence to back up Plato’s assertion, that in total make an argument that some believe is sufficient to prove a revolt, while others remain unconvinced. Drs. Lazenby and Cawkwell believe in the revolt, while as of the time of his book Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History, which I draw from for this entry, Dr. Cartledge was agnostic.

First, at Olympia the Spartans dedicated spoils from a war with the Messenians. Pausanias writes that this was dedicated after the second Messenian revolt, which would be the revolt in 465 BC, following the devastation of Sparta by earthquake.

Pausanias, Description of Greece, (5.24.3)
“On the right of the great temple is a Zeus facing the rising of the sun, twelve feet high and dedicated, they say, by the Lacedaemonians, when they entered on a war with the Messenians after their second revolt. On it is an elegiac couplet: “Accept, king, son of Cronus, Olympian Zeus, a lovely image, and have a heart propitious to the Lacedaemonians.”

L. H. Jeffery (JHS, LXVI 1949) showed that the way in which the letters were formed in the dedication could not have been used as late a 465, thus there must have been a “messenian war” before this, but not so early as the first revolt in the early 7th C.

Second, there is a tripod dedicated at Amyclai by Callon to success in a Messenian war. “There are also bronze tripods. The older ones are said to be a tithe of the Messenian war” (Paus. 3.18.7). Callon is thought to have been active at around the turn of the 5th C.

Third, we have a statue dedicated to Zeus, again noted by Pausanias (4.33.2) “The statue of Zeus is the work of Ageladas and was made originally for the Messenian settlers in Naupactus.” But Ageladas worked in the early half of the 5th century and not as late as 460.

Fourth, Anaxilas, an early 5th century Tyrant of Rhegium in southern Italy along with a group of Messenians seized and Zankle in north-eastern Sicily and renamed it Messene in 489-88 BC (E. S. G. Robinson, JHS LXVI 1946).

Fifth, Aristomenes was a Messenian hero from Andania (Paus. 4.14.7). He has been variously dated to the initial subjugation of Messena in the late 8th c, the first revolt some 40 years later, and by the Hellenistic poet Rhianos in his Messeniaka to the late 5th century. A web of evidence including the lives of supposed descendants that has become known as the “Rhianos Hypothesis” supports this later date. For example we are told one of his daughters married Theopompos of Heria, who was an Olympic victor in 284 and 480 BC.

Lastly, there are dedications by ” Messenians” at Delphi in the early 5th century. These and the various instances of the movements of Messenians to colonies could reflect an uprising and its later defeat by the Spartans. Why there should be an uprising at this time is easy to imagine. Surely the Messenians knew by 491 BC that the Persians were coming. One wonders, if the revolt is fact, if it was coup of the Persians or their allies.

There is one last possibility I should mention. Cleomenes I gained the Agiad throne in about 520 BC, and was perhaps one of the most interesting Spartans Kings. As was common with Spartan royalty, he was often at odds with the Spartan legislature. Spartan Kings were severely limited in their power when not on campaign with the army. What they did have were powerful factions within the citizen body politic. More than most, Cleomenes I was ruthless in his politics. His actions led to the famous dethroning and defection of Damaratus to the Persian King’s court.
Later, at a moment of political weakness, his foes attacked, leading him to flee to Arcadia- perhaps by way of Sellasia not Thessaly. There he appears to have been rallying the Arcadians. His modern advocates look to this as a great panhellenic gesture in preparation for facing the Persians. Perhaps I am less generous, but the examples of Damaratus, Lysander, Cleonymus, and his namesake Cleomenes III, all make a direct use of this Arcadian base as a pawn in a power play for Spartan power likely. Remember, this is the man who once famously termed himself an “Achean” in an Athenian temple. If he was rousing Arcadians, is it impossible that there was also some intrigue with Messenians?

Perhaps it was this revolt that prompted the Spartans to bring 7 helots for every Spartan hoplite to the battle of Plataea. Keep your friends close, but your revolting subjects closer…

Further reading:

Sparta and Lakonia: a regional history, 1300-362 BC, Paul Cartledge, Psychology Press, 2002

Cleomenes, G. Cawkwell, Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, Vol. 46 (Nov., 1993)

Discrepancies in olympiad dating and chronological problems of archaic Peloponnesian history, Pamela-Jane Shaw, Volume 166 of Historia. Einzelschriften, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003

Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia, W. P. Wallace, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 74 (1954)

A Quantitative Evaluation of Hoplite Combat

2010-07-21T18:46:00.006-04:00

For years now I have advocated that those interested in hoplite combat should make greater use of reenactors who put a great deal of time and money into acquiring an authentic hoplite panoply. Many groups of reenactors exist all over the globe, and I know memeber of many of them. In discussing various hoplte topics with them, one thing is clear: if you ask any two reenactors the way hoplites did something, you'll get three opinions. The fundamental problem is that all the conclusions they draw are based on anectdotal evidence. This does not make any of them wrong, even when they disagree, but the lack of standardization makes comparing between them almost impossible. Often we can't know exaclty why they had different experiences.

It has long been a goal of mine to assist groups of reenactors in generating quantitative data on various aspects of hoplite combat. This would be hard data, numbers that we could crunch to provide a true comparison between individuals and between hoplite reenactment groups.

There are many elements of hoplite combat that need to be tested, but my main concern is the safety of reenactors, thus no othismos for the time being. I've attached an image that could serve as a first attempt at a standardized test for hoplite groups. This set-up is a basic stabbing test. The data will give us a rate of striking for a hoplite in formation. I think this rate can be fairly well correlated to the offensive potential of hoplites engaged in doratismos. By altering the size of the target and requiring more accuracy, we can simulate strikes that would "kill" or wound. Because we are simulating group combat, at least three men side by side are needed to create a hoplite bounded on both flanks by other men. For our purposes only the central hoplite can be have his strike number recorded, for only he in flanked by others.

Within this basic set-up, we can alter a variety of variables:

Duration of test period: stamina
Size of target (moving target): accuracy
Grip type: underhand or overhand
Number of ranks in the phalanx
Lateral inter-hoplite spacing
Fore-and-aft spacing
Number of ranks stabbing forward at targets (1, 2 or 3)
Striking while under physical pressure from rear ranks of various length files
Change focus to record the striking rate of the second or third man in the file

Here is a second simple test. This one is to quantify the loss of cohesion that we all know occurs as a phalanx advances rapidly in close order. You simply measure the distance between a point on any adjacent hoplites in rank or file- I suggest the left foot. Then you have the formation advance at whatever speed and in whatever formation you wish to test. The men are made to stop at some signal, a horn or simple shout is preferable to a demarkation so that it is harder to predict. Then you simply remeasure the distances between hoplites. The deviation between each pair from their original spacing is a measure of a loss of order. From there you can ask if they became tighter or looser. The test can be repeated varying the with different starting formations, individual advancing posture, distance, and speed of advance, etc.

I've got a few groups signed on for some testing and welcome any who seek to join. Whatever we are able to do I will run appropriate statistics on and we'll try to publish someplace so that we can all refer to it. Obviously a large number of individuals being tested is good to control for variation between hoplites, but I'd like to get multiple groups involved as well if possible. I welcome discussion on this experiment and hopefully we can plan other experiments as well.

Schwartz and Mathew on Hoplite Combat

2010-06-07T18:44:00.006-04:00

I just received Adam Schwartz's "Reinstating the Hoplite: Arms, Armour and Phalanx Fighting in Archaic and Classical Greece". It is an excellent resource, and a good rebuttal to many of the weak points of Hans Van Wees "Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities." Unfortunately, he passes over some of Van Wees better ideas and propagates mechanics for othismos which you should recognize as flawed if you've read through my previous posts. There is not all that much new in the book, and some of the the newer elements are subject to logical flaws, but as a review it is an excellent resource if you can afford to add it to your shelf.

The book is most useful to me in that he provides passages from German works that have been opaque to me until now. One of these is a book by Franz (2002) that actually discusses crowd behavior, though once again confusing the manner in which force is generated in crowds. Still, I would have cited him in my 2007 paper had I known he even broached the topic.

I'll do an in-depth review of this book at some point. Perhaps comparing where I agree with him and where Van Wees and Goldsworthy are correct.

The second work that has come into my possession is a paper by Chris Mathew, "When Push Comes to Shove: What was the Othismos of Hoplite Combat?" I have corresponded with Chris in the past, a hoplite reenactor and a very nice fellow. I was very pleased to see a reenactor working for his Ph.D. and looked forward to his input into the debate. Unfortunately I cannot agree with most of his views on hoplite battle. His main assertion, that hoplites fought with the dory using what I and others have termed the "high underhand" grip, is surely incorrect. As with the book above, I will try to do a full review of this paper in the near future. I think his main problem is that he was working within the paradigm of the "charge directly into othismos" crowd. The formations he describes are well suited to defeating such a charge, but taken out of that context can be shown to be quite ill suited to hoplite combat.

Syssition to Phitidion

2010-05-21T13:30:00.003-04:00

Change has come to Hollow Lakedaimon. You will note that we are no longer the online syssition, we have laconized to the online Phitidion. Phitidia is what the common messes were called at Sparta, so I have broken down and made the change though I do like the sound of syssition much more. Here's what Plutarch had to say:

Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus chapter 12:

(1) As for the public messes, the Cretans call them andreia, but the Lacedaemonians phitidia, either because they are conducive to friendship [philia] and friendliness, or because they accustom men to simplicity and thrift, for which their word is pheidô. But it is quite possible, as some say, that the first letter of the word phitidia has been added to it, making phitidia out of editia, which refers merely to meals and eating. (2) They met in companies of fifteen, a few more or less, and each one of the mess-mates contributed monthly a bushel [medimnos] of barley-meal, eight gallons of wine, five pounds [mnai] of cheese, two and a half pounds of cheese, two and a half pounds of figs, and in addition to this, a very small sum of money for such relishes as flesh and fish. Besides this, whenever any one made a sacrifice of first fruits or brought home game from the hunt, he sent a portion to his mess. For whenever any one was made late by a sacrifice or the chase, he was allowed to dine at home, but the rest had to be at the mess. (3) For a long time this custom of eating at common mess-tables was rigidly observed. For instance, when King Agis, on returning from an expedition in which he had been victorious over the Athenians, wished to dine at home with his wife, and sent for his rations, the Polemarchs refused to send them to him; and when on the following day his anger led him to omit the customary sacrifice, they laid a fine on him.

(4) Boys also used to come to these public messes, as if they were attending schools of sobriety; there they would listen to political discussions and see instructive models of free behavior [eleutheria]. There they themselves also became accustomed to sport and jest without scurrility, and to endure jesting without displeasure. Indeed, it seems to have been especially characteristic of a Spartan to endure jesting; but if anyone could not bear up under it, he had only to ask it, and the jester ceased. As each one came in, the eldest of the company pointed to the door and said to him, "Through that door no word goes forth outside." (5) And they say that a candidate for membership in one of these messes underwent the following ordeal. Each of the mess-mates took in his hand a bit of soft bread, and when a servant came along with a bowl upon his head, then they cast it into this without a word, like a ballot, leaving it just as it was if he approved of the candidate, but if he disapproved, squeezing it tight in his hand first. (6) For the flattened piece of bread had the force of a perforated, or negative, ballot. And if one such is found in the bowl, the candidate is not admitted to the mess, because they wish all its members to be congenial. The candidate thus rejected is said to have been 'kaddished' [kekaddisthai], for kaddichos is the name of the bowl into which they cast the pieces of bread. (7) Of their dishes, the black broth [zomos] is held in the highest esteem, so that the elderly men do not even ask for a bit of meat, but leave it for the young men, while they themselves have the broth poured out for their meals. And it is said that one of the kings of Pontos actually bought a Spartan cook for the sake of having this broth, and then, when he tasted it, disliked it; whereupon the cook said, 'O King, those who relish this broth must first have bathed in the River Eurotas.' After drinking moderately, they go off home without a torch; for they are not allowed to walk with a light, either on this or any other occasion, that they may accustom themselves to marching boldly and without fear in the darkness of night. Such, then, is the fashion of their common messes.

Unfounded Objections to Othismos

2010-05-04T14:26:00.002-04:00

The biggest objections to othismos dissapear when you accept my definition of othismos only occuring at crowd-like densities and understand how crowds push:

"Battles were long, men can't push that long."

The crowd cannot do anything fast. As soon as it starts to advance it begins to lose cohesion. Once this occurs it cannot transfer force through the ranks effectively. That is not to say "pushing" stops, but by my definition, the type of pushing done by the first few ranks with not transfer of force from deep in the file is not true "othismos", but the same shield bashing and pushing seen in a clash of any group of close-in fighters such as during Roman battles. For the most part in the Crowd-Othismos men are simply standing and leaning. It is exhausting, perhaps moreso mentally than physically, but no more than active weapons duelling. The phalanx does not advance like a steam roller, but like a ratchet, with perdiodic loosening and tightening of the ranks. When a rapid advance does occur, like it must have as one side gave way, it was only the front ranks pushing and even they were doing more "herding" like we see with riot police and crowds, than pushing in the sense of othismos.

An advance in true othismos can only occur through shuffling steps until one side gives way. As they begin to rout, they reduce the pressure on their foes that the othismos-crowd requires.

"Men can't fight and push"

When authors envisioned men bent over like rugby scrummers I could understand this objection. In the Crowd-Othismos, men are standing upright, and but for the extreme close range, their right arms are free to do whatever they wish with them. Obviously at this range you cannot use your dory against the man ahead of you, but the dory is some 8' long, not an Iklwa. It could not be used at any range approaching shield on shield contact. Swords, broken spears, fists, foot-stomps/hooks and teeth would be the order of the day.

"Twelve ranks of Spartans could not resist 50 ranks of Thebans for more than a few moments and yet we know that this phase of battle lasted for some time, with the Spartans even gaining ground to pick up their fallen King."

Not a problem when we understand that coordination of the crowds movements is what adds force in the othismos. There is only so much coordination you can get out of a file of 50 men. Even with a deep phalanx you probably can't get much more than 8-12 ranks perfectly coordinated. Thus, each side produces a forward thrust of about the same size at any given moment. As we wrote above, the depth acts like a wall behind your back. If you are pushed back, it forces all your ranks to tighten and become de facto coordinated to resist being moved. Twelve ranks of Spartans could push back the Thebans, but at a great disadvantage. The figurative "uphill battle" could only end one way.

I'll note that my distinction of pushing at different densities, with othimos only occurring at the tightest packed is not something that the Greeks would have made. They only speak of battles coming down to pushing, they did not disect the process and probably did not undertand it any better than a college kid rushing a stage at a rock concert. To them the whole process was one event.

Three Myths of Othismos

2010-04-27T11:55:00.002-04:00

As you can tell by now, I am an advocate of a literal pushing othismos. Because of this I am frustrated by some elements of the pro-othismos arguement as it is currently put forth. I've mentioned these problems previously, but they bear repeating:

Myth 1: "The rim on the aspis evolved as the shield became heavier to allow the weight to be borne on the shoulder as well as the arm."

If you look at the cross-section of an aspis, it is clear that the rim section is far thicker than the core of the face of the shield. Thus a substantial portion of the weight of the shield is in the very rim that they would hypothesize grew to ease the carrying of said weight! A rimless aspis is no heavier than many other single grip shields. Sure, there are images that show the hoplites hanging the shield of their shoulder by the rim, but there are far more showing hoplites with their Corinthian helms pushed back, and I doubt many would support fighting with them in this position. Hanging the aspis by its rim on the shoulder simply takes advantage of the profile, which evolved for a very different purpose.

Myth 2: "Hoplites pushed en masse with their bodies side-on, their left shoulders in the bowl of the aspis, pressing into the back of the man in front."

The illogic of this one becomes apparent if we try to envision a file doing so. Clearly this can only work for the second ranker pushing the first ranker. Beyond that the men's backs are perpendicular to the men behind them! The could push into the right shoulder of the men in front, but that renders weapons play impossible- something the side-on stance is supposed to allow. The other problem is that at anything approaching maximum pushing force for a file, the men would collapse into the bowl of their shields in any case and be square to the foes as they should be.

Myth 3: "Hoplites charge rapidly to add momentum to othismos."

This one is counterintuitive, so I don't blame them for not foreseeing it, but a slow packed advance generates more force, faster than a series of single men impacting like rams. With no need to move to othismos directly from the charge, an extended period can occur of spear fencing prior to a pushing occurring. This eliminates a major difference between the pro- and anti- push crowds.

An image of Othismos

2010-03-11T22:55:00.004-05:00

I happened upon an image of othismos as I describe it in my crowd-othismos model: men packed tight belly to back, not pushing side-on. This is an frame from the Discovery Channel's War and Civilization that can be seen on youtube.com. Here we can see the type of packing that must occur. Yes, I know the shields are terrible. You can see that in this environment the overhand grip on the spear will provide a much broader range of motion than even a high underhand grip. You'll also see that at this range the dory is useless for fighting in the front rank against your immediate foe. There is no way to choke up on the shaft far enough to bring an 8' spear to bear on the rank ahead of you. Thus, either the first rank used swords, or fought past the men in front, aiming deeper in the enemy ranks.

Another thing you can see is why I think the shields must overlap right over left, i.e: the man on the left comes up behind the overhanging shield of the man to his right. In the image below, the arrows show a weak point in the shield-wall when overlapped left over right as under the top arrow. The reason this joint gives way is that the portion of shield off to a man's left is easier to push back than the portion to the right. The flange to the left acts as a lever on the hoplites arm, while the right side, if forced back, is pushed into his body.

Now look at the lower arrow and you will see that pushing here only tightens the bond between shields and strengthens the wall, forcing both shields back into the body of the hoplite on the left.

The official soundtrack to this blog.

2009-11-26T12:40:00.002-05:00

I recently stumbled upon this band on youtube and have to support anyone who sings about Sparta.

Crowd density

2009-08-31T15:22:00.003-04:00

I am often asked how and why men enter the close-packed formation needed to conduct the othsimos as I define it. Here is a little video by some reenactors showing how to breach a shield wall. Note the lengths they go to to keep their men packed belly to back. If Hoplites conducted short terminal charges directly into othismos- as opposed to long running charges straight into othismos, which I doubt- then this is how the men packed. Only by packing tight can you transfer your aggregate force. These guys in fact charge too far, since any distance past that needed to achieve their "ramming" speed is wasted. Because close order is more important than velocity, this can be done from very close range after a period of spear fencing as well as from the opeing of combat.

The only way to resist men in this formation is to match it. A dense, close-packed phalanx will simply absorb this. Multiply this interaction along the front of a unit within the phalanx and you can see how it occurred.

The Harmodios blow

2009-07-14T11:32:00.005-04:00

I recently re-read a paper on Greek swordsmanship:

“Footwork in Ancient Greek Swordsmanship”
Brian F. Cook, Metropolitan Museum Journal, Vol. 24 (1989), pp. 57-64

In this paper an overhead strike is discussed. With minor variations it appears as below.

From the paper:

“The so-called "Harmodios blow" studied by Shefton, who coined the useful term by which it is now fairly generally known. This is a slashing movement named for the action of Harmodios in the marble statuary group of the Tyrant-slayers best known from a Roman copy in Naples. The moment most frequently represented is the point of stillness when the sword- hand has been raised head-high with the sword pointing backward over the shoulder in readiness for a downward slash. The blow may be delivered either forehand (Figure 1) or backhand (Figure 2). Philip Lancaster, of the Department of Edged Weapons at the Tower of London, who kindly gave advice on some practical aspects of swordsmanship, pointed out that this movement would be hazardous under normal combat conditions: not only is there some danger that it would put a swordsman off balance, but the action would also leave the sword-arm unprotected and vulnerable. B. B. Shefton had already noted that the sword when raised could not be used for parrying, and that in close combat the blow therefore required careful timing. It would have been particularly dangerous for a Greek hoplite in leaving the armpit exposed above the edge of the cuirass.' A further disadvantage of the Harmodios blow is that it was less effective than a thrust against a well-equipped opponent: it would probably have been resisted even by a padded linen corselet, which would have been vulnerable to a thrust, and would certainly have been ineffective against a metal cuirass." In combat, then, the Harmodios blow can only have been a desperate measure, employed when the vulnerability it imposed was outweighed by a greater danger.”

“Finding no examples of the use of the Harmodios blow before the closing years of the sixth century B.C.,' Shefton connected it with the introduction of the spatulate sword, a more versatile weapon than the straight-edged sword, which is most effective in an underhand stabbing or thrusting movement. It is around the same time that warriors began to be represented in Attic red-figure in a stance that, al- though it soon became conventional, may reflect the kind of simple drill-movement for which no literary evidence survives. The movement is in fact so simple that no specific comment was made by ancient authors: like so many minor details of life, it was too familiar at the time to call for explanation.”

Now the above may all be true, but the Harmodios may not have been so dangerous and unlikely as thought by the authors above. In fact the Harmodios blow might be one of the few strikes available to men who are standing in synaspismos, close order with overlapping shields. If men are in close as I have described previously, shield to shield, then the right arm needs to not only strike in this fashion, but also move in this way to ward the head. I have been experimenting with how one could fight in so close, with only the raised right arm given freedom of movement. The answer is very much like the harmodios blow. Better yet would be to adopt a shorter blade like the Spartans may have done.

An interesting note on swords is that the sword (xiphos) is slung in a sheath high under the left arm, almost like a shoulder-holster for a pistol. I have been told by hoplite reenactors that this makes drawing the sword much easier in the confined space of a fighting phalanx. The manner of hanging the sheath may thus be yet another feature of the panoply designed for fighting in crowded conditions.

More on crowd pressures

2009-06-23T16:41:00.007-04:00

Here is some information from a paper on the pressures generated by crowds:

"Prediction of human crowd pressures"
Accident Analysis and Prevention 38 (2006) 712–722
Ris S.C. Lee, Roger L. Hughes

In situations where pedestrians are crushed, the density of the crowd is extremely high and the physical movement of pedestrians is almost impossible. When crushing occurs, the high pressures developed within the crowd, which can bend steel barriers or push down brick walls, can be unbearable to some members of the crowd, producing fatalities from asphyxiation while still standing. Generally, the highest pressures are felt by those pedestrians near any barrier that is checking the advance of the crowd. Such pressures will gradually restrict these people from breathing. Each time a breath is exhaled the weight of the load restricts inhalation of the next breath. A slow death caused by suffocation usually follows, unless rescue is immediate. The internal pressure in a crowd on the time scale of a minute or so is thus the critical criterion for determining the likelihood of an accident involving crushing in the crowd. Tests on live subjects conducted by Evans and Hayden (1971) found that the tolerable force was typically 623N for men when pushed against a 100mm wide flat bar. This force increased to typically 800N when the subject was allowed to push against the bar to reduce loading on his rib cage. For women, Evans and Hayden (1971) reported the tolerance levelwas significantly less. Apart from Evans and Hayden (1971), studies on exploring the magnitude of loadings that could cause crush asphyxia found that death was estimated to have occurred 15 seconds after a load of 6227 N and 4–6 min after 1112 N was applied, see Hopkins et al. (1993). It should be noted that loadings of such as these magnitudes are affected by various factors including age, gender and anatomical build.

From the paper we can see the crushing force generated by the crowd at a rock concert over time (the lighter plot is a prediction, ignore it).

The amount of pressure that is fatal to a human varies depending on the duration, since the asphyxiation can occur over time as described above. Very high pressure (6000+ N) can be almost immediately lethal. From the plot above we can see that over the time period of recording from 5-10 minutes, the crowd pressure was almost never below 800N and reached a peak of 1,500N. Since 623-800N were described as a tolerable limit above, and pressures of 1112N lethal, this crowd would have been intolerable and potentially lethal for most of the period. In the concert many people had to be passed out of the crowd and treated by medical professionals.

From another paper:

“Experiments to investigate the level of ‘comfortable’
loads for people against crush barriers”
R.A. Smith*, L.B. Lim
Safety Science 18 (1995) 329-335

The same authors measured loads at several ‘pop concerts’, where at one they measured
instantaneous peak values of up to 4.2 kN/m, 30-second average values up to 1.8 kN/m
and sustained loadings of typically 1.5 kN/m lasting for 10 minutes. Throughout the first half of an act the sustained average load was 0.8 to 1 kN/m. During the concert, people pressed against the barriers and in distress were rescued by being pulled over the barriers and being treated by medical staff.

This paper had an interesting figure that showed how the pushing force could vary with the degree to which men leaned forward against the man ahead. How this would correlate with forces that hoplite would generate is not really known, but the important thing is to note that the behavior of the men in the crowd can alter the amount of pressure generated. As few as 4-8 men are producing lethal pressures (note the scale of the y-axis is Kilonewtons (1,000N). This data is not even from an especially dense crowd, they can be almost double that density and proportionally more deadly.

The importance of this graph is that it shows that through behavior the amount of force generated by a crowd can be increased. Here simply leaning forward more transmits more force forward. The implication is that through training men can transfer greater force forward more efficiently. This, and other behaviors, is how the system can be tweeked to produce more with training.

Modeling hoplite combat

2009-06-23T16:30:00.004-04:00

I have, after years of trying off and on, finally gotten in contact with Rob McDermott. If you have not seen his simulation of hoplite combat take a look:

http://www.ddv.co.nz/hoplites/

There are many elements that could be added to raise the realism of the model, but the most important thing is to show how a group behavior, such as phalanx combat, can be self-organized. In this model there is no leader. Each simulated hoplite is an "agent" endowed with a list of very simple responses. The only information they recieve is from their immediate surroundings- from the few men around them acting to push or fight them. One of the biggest problems that those who follow my blog have with my view of phalanx combat is that they don't see how such crowd-wide behavior could be coordinated. Rob's model gives an example, though I would change/add a variety of the details I've exposed in previous posts. I plan to create a model with those elements in the future.

Crowds don't need to be big to generate extreme forces.

2009-01-22T13:31:00.005-05:00

One of the most common objections to my model of the othismos phase of hoplite combat as essentially two crowds moving against each other stems from the fact that for most readers the mechanics of crowd pushing is counter-intuitive. They simply do not believe that "crowds" of only a few ranks deep can generate lethal force. To make this clearer I'm posting some snippets from J. Fruin's "The causes and prevention of crowd disasters."

Crowd forces can reach levels that almost impossible to resist or control. Virtually all crowd deaths are due to compressive asphyxia and not the "trampling" reported by the news media. Evidence of bent steel railings after several fatal crowd incidents show that forces of more than 4500 N (1,000 lbs.) occurred. Forces are due to pushing, and the domino effect of people leaning against each other.

So our common notion of "pushing" may not be adequate to completely describe what occurs. The most force may actually be transferred through coordinated "leaning" when crowd densities are very high.

Experiments to determine concentrated forces on guardrails due to leaning and pushing have shown that force of 30% to 75% of participant weight can occur. In a US National Bureau of Standards study of guardrails, three persons exerted a leaning force of 792 N (178 lbs.) and 609 N (137 lbs.) pushing. [9] In a similar Australian Building Technology Centre study, three persons in a combined leaning an pushing posture developed a force of 1370 N (306 lbs.). [10] This study showed that under a simulated "panic", 5 persons were capable of developing a force of 3430 N (766 lbs.).

Only three people exerted a force horizontally against a target by simply leaning into each other that would be the equivalent of the weight of a grown man laying on top of you. Now, you may think that you could bear this weight without suffering from asphyxia, but for how long? If the pressure from even this small group were maintained for any length of time you would succumb to exhaustion and be unable to inflate your lungs. The effect is similar to what occurs when constricting snakes, like pythons and boas, kill. The don't so much crush the breath out of you as simply make it incrementally more difficult for you to expand your diaphragm to take in air.

Another common assumption is that two opposing groups could not generate these forces against each other, that a crowd must be pushing in one direction against a wall. This next quote shows how crowd collisions can be deadly.

In the Cincinnati rock concert incident, a line of bodies was found approximately 9 m (30 ft) from a wall near the entrance. This indicates that crowd pressures probably came from both directions as rear ranks pressed forward and front ranks pushed off the wall.

I hope this demonstrates that phalanxes of 8 ranks could be deadly. Simply scaling up the leaning force from 3 people (178 lbs)to 8 people gives us 475 lbs. There is surely a loss due to lack of coordination, so this figure is probably high, but it shows the principle.

Taking just the conservative leaning estimate, 12 on 12 would be over 720lbs and 16 on 16 ranks might approach 1,000lbs.

Now how exactly to scale up these pressures I do not know, so these are simply ballpark figures. Perhaps they reflect peak pressures, or peak pressures might be much higher. Sustained pressures are smaller, but even a fraction of this force would be deadly unless the hoplites were protected by the aspis. Peak pressures could surely even crush the aspis, as we know occurred in some battles, which would then leave the hoplite defenseless against further compression.

For some further reading: http://www.crowddynamics.com/Main/Fruin%20-%20causes.htm

Crowd othismos model

2008-11-12T23:39:00.014-05:00

If you've read the paper below then you already know this, but I will summarize the key points and contrast them with the other two alternative views (simplified of course).

Orthodox view: Othismos is literally a mass pushing match with the aim being to push opponents back until the cohesion of their battle-line breaks. In the most widely proposed form, the clash of hoplite phalanxes progressed along the following pattern: Both phalanxes charged at a slow run from about 200 meters apart. Hoplites move directly into shield-on-shield contact from the charge using the momentum to smash their shields together like rams and stabbing with spears underhand like cavalry lances. Spears are often shivered and opposing ranks become to some extent interlaced. This is followed by intense infighting with swords as ranks reform through a process not well explained and the ranks behind the front-rankers begin to push forward. It is this pushing phase that is labelled “othismos” (pushing) and the pushing is done side-on to the man in front with the left shoulder in the bowl of the shield. This othismos continues until one side gives way and collapses. Once one side collapses the victors pursue (but not too far) and the losers sustain many casualties.

Heretical view: There are many variations of this, so I shall present it as I think most consistent with the hoplite panoply. The progress of battle differs from the orthodoxy in that there is no running charge directly into combat. They note that the run would cause disorder in the ranks that this would be counter to the whole idea of forming ranks in the first place. Combat occurs at spear's length, perhaps with shields overlapped, perhaps not, in a phase known to the Hellenistic Greeks as doratismos. Fighting might then progress to infighting with shield-bashing on an individual, uncoordinated scale. While the front-rankers and the one or two ranks behind them fight, the men to the rear provide only moral support and make ready to step over their corpses to take a place in the battle line. The advance of the phalanx is figuratively labelled “othismos” as we might speak of an armored "push" of tanks and mechanized infantry. Fighting occurs until one side gives way due to mounting casualties and morale failure. As before, the losing side suffers as the victors pursue.

Othismos-crowd model: This view incorporates elements of both of the above. In my view there is a running charge from a couple hundred meters as in the view of the orthodoxy, but with spears held up overhand. This does not lead directly into othismos, for there is no crash of hoplites seeking to use momentum to bash into their foes, and thus no interlacing of opposing ranks. Front ranks pull up from the charge prior to shield contact with their foes, then close to the approximately 5' distance from their foes that reflects the reach of the dory, entering doratismos as in the heretic's view. They then spear fence en masse as envisioned by the heretics, but at a spacing of something less than 1 m frontage, their aspides just overlapped. Only the second rank uses their spears in support of the front rank.
At some point there is a shift in phase to fighting at less than spear range. Closing to less than spear range would be natural if a hoplite’s spear was broken, for he would then find himself with the choice of standing in the ranks unable to reach the enemy, leaving the ranks to move in close, or staying in the ranks, but pressuring the men beside him to move in as a group. As more spears are lost this urging in close magnifies until the line moves. This describes how the move into close range could emerge without any central command, but it is possible that men were purposefully led into close range fighting.
It is possible to move from advance to othismos without a spear-fencing stage, but it is unlikely that this occurred as the more recent formulations of the orthodoxy put forward, with men running into each other in an uncoordinated manner. In order to maximize force, the men must pack their files tight before they hit the enemy phalanx rather than run in directly from the charge. Spartans would have had an easier time of this due to their slower advance.
However it occurs, when the opposing units are in close contact, the rear rankers close up behind those in front for physical support. The weapons used by hoplites are well designed for this type of fighting over the top of the shield rims. The ranks continue to tighten until the men are belly to back with the men in front and behind. How long this takes can vary with training in a polis or over time, but eventually this compact mass enters the othismos phase of battle. If the opposing front rankers are already shield to shield, then the progression to othismos is gradual and fluid. If they are at a distance, then there is a short and shuffling charge by the whole mass (as seen in the videos on this site). The two phalanxes now function like crowds, generating intense force as they push against each other. Men in the middle of the mass do not control their own movement, but ride the waves of flesh, all the while fighting and defending with sword or broken spear in their upraised right arm. The pressure is enough that these men would be asphyxiated without the aspis. If shields break under the pressure men die, unless they can breathe within the bowl of the overlap of the man to their right's shield. There may be lulls in the combat where the opposing phalanxes loosen this tight level of packing due to exhaustion, the front men may still be fighting or they too may pull apart. Eventually one side gives way and the same pursuit seen in the other models occurs.

As you see, my model incorporates the possibility of extended initial doratismos with literal othismos. My othismos is a far more brutal thing than that described by the orthodoxy. The momentum of men charging at 5 mph produced forces that are similar to the maximum seen in the crowd-crush. More importantly, individual collisions are also instantaneous, lasting a few miliseconds, while the pressure within crowds can be maintained for extended periods and is far more lethal. Men pushing side-on with the shoulder in the shield cannot generate the enormous crowd-like crushing forces that men pushing belly to back can. As the pressure builds, side-on men will collapse to belly to back if there is room to, and if there is no space between them and the men beside them, then they are vulnerable to asphyxia since their diaphragm is not in the belly of the shield.

To a buzzard circling the battlefield othismos would look like this, with only the rear rankers able to push sideways.

If we compare a side-on to belly to back postures of hoplites n the phalanx, you will see the difference in the density of the crowd packing, though the side-on man have a more narrow frontage. Under pressure these sideways men will collapse to face forward, absorbing the force of the men pushing them from behind instead of transferring it to the man in front of them. The pushing forces generated by a crowd can be greater than the smashing force of an initial running collision of shields, and there is no disruption of order from interlacing front ranks.

As I am able I will add more comparative details of the mechanics. So far I have not leaned heavily on primary sources, but I am putting together a post in which I shall interpret the words of ancient authors to support my position, just as both the heretics and orthodoxy have used alternate interpretations of many of the same quotes to support their position and rule out the other.

How phalanxes clashed

2008-10-28T13:07:00.002-04:00

To date there has been no hoplite reenactment groups with enough men and the will to go at it full speed to properly recreate phalanx on phalanx combat. There are reenactors of other periods who have "discovered" the same crowd mechanics that I elucidated below. The following is a video that my friend Giannis Kadoglou found thst shows how large groups of armed and armored men collide. At about 20 seconds into the video you will see a close approximation a clash of shallow phalanxes. Note that as I described, they stand facing their opponents, not side-on as had been widely proposed and now seems generally accepted.

The Aspis: surviving hoplite battle. Part 2

2008-10-17T15:02:00.001-04:00

Those who support a literal interpretation of the othismos as a pushing match have pointed out that the hollow design of the shield allows the left shoulder to be placed within it both to support the weight of the shield and to allow for a sideways pushing stance, while the flattened face provides a broad surface for pushing against the men in front of you. While correct in some details, this scheme fails when we apply a realistic model of othismos mechanics.

John Keegan, in The Face of Battle, noted that a crowd is the opposite of an army when he applied crowd psychology to formed men, and that crowd-like behavior signaled immanent defeat, but the ancient Greeks harnessed the force of a panicked crowd and turned it into an offensive weapon. The modeling of how force is generated in crowds is in its infancy, but the destructive potential is shown by the many tragic deaths caused by crowds colliding during sports events or fleeing in panic.

The outcome of a collision of ranked hoplites is not simply a matter of the number of men on either side. Most of the force applied by the rear ranks will be simply absorbed by the mass of their own men in front of them. In order to maximize the pushing force of a crowd, the distance between bodies must be minimized to the point that individuals lose control of their own movement and the group becomes one mass pushing in synchrony. In crowds of this density, shock waves are produced that can tear off clothing, lift people off their feet, and propel them 3 m or more through the air. These forces are generated by a domino effect of people leaning against each other and pushing in the same direction at once, and have been shown to exceed 1000 lbs of force and bend metal retaining structures. Death occurs in these conditions due to compressive asphyxia when the diaphragm is crushed and breathing is impossible.

Men must protect against asphyxiation if they are to subject themselves to these forces for the duration of battle. This is the aspis’ primary function and a role for which it is uniquely designed. The shield’s large diameter arose from the need to hold the shield across the front of the body, its flat rim resting on the upper chest and thighs, while the depth protected the diaphragm and allowed the hoplite to draw breath. The central position of the porpax ensured proper alignment, but left about a third of the shield extending beyond the hoplite to the left. As individuals with their shields tight to their chest came up behind the overhanging shields of men to their right, overlapping right over left, a phalanx assembled like building blocks. The job of rear rank veterans, who could push with their shoulders, was not simply to keep men from fleeing battle, but to keep them packed belly to back and as tightly as possible. The lethal zone in a crowd of this density extended well back into the phalanx, so the risk of death by asphyxiation was shared more equally among ranks than the danger from weapon strikes.

Along with the characteristic aspis, a second element of the panoply associated with the emergence of hoplites is the sauroter, a specialized butt-spike for the spear. The sauroter has been linked to phalanx combat through its use as an auxillary weapon, but this role was secondary to its use as a staff in steadying a man in the rear ranks and allowing him to add the strength of his right arm in pushing.

Weapons could still be used in the press of othismos, as the raised right arm would have just enough room to brandish a weapon in an overhand strike in the “V” formed by overlapped shields. The downward stabbing strike of a spear would require very little range of motion to be deadly, while the point-heavy chopping swords commonly used relied on a snap of the wrist more than a broad slash. The most deadly weapon in this press would be the short Laconian dagger stabbing in a downward strike from above. If the othismos gradually became the phase of battle that decided hoplite battles, this may explain the abandonment of body armor and enclosed helms for the high-peaked pilos that protected from overhead strikes. Any benefit of armor in the crowd would be outweighed by the need for increased stamina and the ability to breathe freely and hear commands.

That the Spartans developed a specialized weapon for the othismos is perhaps indicative of their role in perfecting this phase of combat. We are told that the Spartans did not excel in combat because of the martial arts teaching of hoplomachoi, but because of their singing and dancing. The reason for this is obvious if we accept the model presented above. Accidental synchronicity of effort is what builds lethal shock waves in crowds, so men who have trained to coordinate their motions through group dancing and rhythmically chanted songs will have an advantage in producing and amplifying forces in the othismos. Theban success in battle was explained in part by their skill in wrestling which develops kinesthetic sense and ability to read and anticipate motions.

Thebes met Sparta in battle again at Leuktra in 371 B.C. in the ultimate othismos battle. In an outcome presaged by Koronea, the Thebans countered Spartan skill with mass. The 12 ranks of Sparta collided with 50 ranks of Theban hoplites, who had added Boetian merchants and baggage-carriers to the rear of the phalanx. Our model of othismos helps us understand what happened next. The deep Theban formation did not crash into the Spartans and immediately drive it from the field. What followed was an almost tidal play of crowd against crowd. The synchronized Spartans could push back the Thebans, as they did to claim their wounded King, but each time they did this they packed them tighter, forcing them into a coordination that they may not have achieved on their own. There may have been long lulls where exhausted men simply fought for breath in the loosening crowds. Epaminondas’ called-for “one more step” was in reality a shuffle, but the Thebans eventually gained ground in a ratcheting advance that broke the Spartan ranks and their hegemony.

The othismos turned a phalanx into more than sum of its ranked hoplites. To fight within such a crowd was to submerge one’s individuality, and facing one was like standing against single scale-breasted beast, a many-headed hydra of down-thrusting weapons. Perhaps it is fitting that the states who mastered it were both descended from Heracles.

Paul M. Bardunias is not a historian, but an entomologist who studies group behavior in social insects- termites and ants. On the theory that one Myrmidon is as good as another, he is applying concepts from his background in biology and crowd behavior to an examination of the evolution of Greek weapons and tactics. He was born to the topic, his family comes from Sparta, but this is his first publication specifically on Greek warfare. He lives and works in Hollywood, Florida, USA.

Further reading:

J. Fruin, The Causes and Prevention of Crowd Disasters, in: R. A. Smith, J. F. Dickie (Eds.), Engineering for Crowd Safety. Elsevier, New York, 1993.

A. K. Goldsworthy, The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle. War in History 4: 1, 1-26, 1997.

V. D. Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry battle in Classical Greece. New York, Hodder & Stoughton, 1989.

J. Keegan, The Face of Battle. London, Cape, 1976.

R. D. Luginbill, Othismos: The Importance of Mass-Shove in Hoplite Warfare. Phoenix, 48:1, 51-61, 1994.

N. Secunda, Greek Hoplite 480-323 BC. Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2000.

A. Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour and Weapons. Edinburgh University Press, 1964.

The Aspis: surviving hoplite battle. Part 1

2008-10-17T14:56:00.002-04:00

The Aspis: Surviving Hoplite Battle.

Agiselaos II of Sparta stood victorious on the battlefield of Koronea in 394 B.C. when he learned that the Thebans had defeated his allies and were looting his baggage train. Showing more bravery than tactical sense, he formed his phalanx directly across the Theban line of retreat rather than taking them in the flank or rear as they passed. Sources do not reveal how many ranks of hoplites faced each other in this struggle, but the Spartans likely formed in 12, while the Thebans may have formed as they had at Delium, in 25 ranks, for a similar breakthrough attempt. The Spartan force, “…crashed against the Thebans front to front: and setting shields against shields they pushed, fought, killed, and were killed.” (Xenophon, Hellenica 4.3.19). The Spartans were victorious, but the Theban loss obscures the fact that their extra-deep phalanx broke through the Spartan phalanx. A description of the aftermath of the battle conveys the brutality of the clash: “a weird spectacle met the eye… the earth stained with blood, friend and foe lying dead side by side, shields crushed to pieces, spears snapped in two, daggers bared of their sheaths, some on the ground, some embedded in the bodies, some yet gripped by the hand.” (Xenophon, Agiselaos 2.1.14).

What Xenophon described is the result of a phase of hoplite battle termed Othismos. The term implies “pushing”, and has traditionally been taken to mean a clash between the massed ranks of hoplites where the goal was literally to push back the other formation until it broke due to a loss of cohesion and failure of morale.

The mechanics, and even existence, of this mass-scrum have been hotly debated over the last half-century in a series of papers whose titles imply nothing less than a protestant revolution. One proponent of the “heretical” view points out that no other army fought through such a pushing match: “Should it be proved that the othismos really was a contest of massed shoving…It would be necessary to explain how the Greeks were able to fight in this unique way, and why they did so.” (Goldsworthy)

The answer to Goldsworthy’s challenge lies in understanding the hoplite shield, which is often referred to as a hoplon and seen as lending its name to the hoplite. However, the term hoplon can refer to any implement of war. The specific term is aspis and sometimes rendered as Argive aspis, although the connection to Argos, either as originator or mass- producer, is unclear. The shield may have originated as early as the late 8th or early 7th century B.C. and survived in nearly identical form for at least three hundred years.

Round to slightly oval in outline, normally 80 cm to 1 m in diameter and about approximately 7.5 kg weight, its characteristic features are a convex profile and a robust, offset outer rim. A surviving Etruscan example in the Museo Gregoriano of the Vatican that appears similar to less well preserved examples from Greece was constructed of 20-30 cm poplar wood planks glued together horizontally to form a solid block, then turned on a lathe to form the characteristic shallow dome shape that left the flattened center of the core thinner than the curving outer edges. This shield has a diameter of 82cm, a depth of 10 cm and a 4.5 cm off-set rim reinforced with wooden laminates. Construction methods may have changed with time because shields represented on the 7th century Chigi vase appear to be made of layers of thin wooden laths. The shield’s inner face was usually covered with leather and sometimes highly decorated. The face of the Vatican shield is covered in a seamless .5 mm layer of bronze that overlaps the inner face of the rim by 4 cm. This fully bronze-faced front of the shield is commonly portrayed, but archaeological finds show that bronze plating of the rim alone, perhaps with a bronze blazon, was more common. Some depictions show additional metal bands reinforcing the inner face of the shield.

In use the aspis was supported by a double grip system. At the center of the shield’s concave interior was a bronze loop, the Porpax, through which the left forearm was placed to bear the weight of the shield. The porpax was secured to the shield’s inner face by long vertical bronze straps. This structure could be one piece or made so that the armband was removable, as the Spartans are said to have done to render their shields unusable to rebellious Helot serfs. A second grip, the antilabe, was for the left hand and was placed near the rim. The grip was a pair of metal staples through which a rope passed that traveled through four or more metal rings spaced around the inside perimeter of the shield.

This peculiar shield’s evolution is not well understood. Round, bronze-faced shields were common in the region prior to its appearance, but these were generally single-grip and did not display the twin features of domed shape and off-set rim. Assyrian infantry carried large, deeply convex shields of bronze, but they had a single grip and were cone-shaped. Urartian bronze shields, which have been excavated at Toprakkale near Lake Van in Anatolia, were domed with offset rims. Their diameter, 77 cm to 1 m, differed little from hoplite shields. These had a triple-grip system that has been interpreted to be a single hand grip and two points of attachment for a neck strap or telamon, but may have influenced Greek design.

Much attention has been paid to the convex shape of the aspis. Convex or sloped armor presents a greater thickness of wood to be penetrated by weapons impacting at oblique angles. This fact alone might explain the convex Assyrian shields, for their cone shape is the optimal profile to maximize this effect. The Greek shield is less well adapted for this, since the greatest slope is relegated to a small area at the outer edge, while the broad face of the shield is a shallow curve. Curvature also insures that chopping weapons will be impact on a broad area rather than biting into the rim of a shield. The semi-cylindrical examples of the Roman scutum may be made for this, but in the aspis the curvature by being confined to a narrow band at the edges is too extreme to maximize this form of protection and the robust rim would seem to negate its necessity. That the aspis is thinner at its center than at the edges differs from other shield types and indicates that protection from penetration was not the only factor in its design.

The uniqueness of this shield is apparent if we analyze it from a structural engineer’s perspective. A domed profile can support great weight without collapsing and indicates a load-bearing function. The dome of the aspis is shallow and less efficient, so increased force on the flattened surface will cause the rim will be thrust outward. Trusses or supports that resist this outward force are needed to keep the shallow dome from popping inside out like an umbrella in the wind. In the aspis, this was accomplished by its thickened rim. The off-set design presents the maximum thickness of wood against the force attempting to push the rim outwards. A bronze sheath adds to this as the tensile strength of the metal resists stretching. On some depictions, narrow metal reinforcements are seen around the inner surface. These add little protection, but would aid greatly in supporting the integrity of the load-bearing dome. The enigmatic rope that runs around the inner surface and forms the antilabe may have had its origins as a cable truss to add additional support to the inner face of the dome. The Greeks used such cable trusses, upozwmata, to keep their ships from bending up in the center, or "hogging," from pressure on the hull.

My article on hoplite combat

2008-10-02T15:33:00.004-04:00

This is the article I wrote for Ancient Warfare magazine that spawned this blog, the issue is now out of print so I have decided to link to it. It presents a new model of Othismos and hoplite warfare which differs greatly from previous attempts at reconstruction.

http://www.hostalis.net/documents/theaspis.zip

You will see that most of the posts I have made here have been groundwork for this model. I will go into greater detail in future posts.

Back to domed shields

2008-07-17T14:47:00.005-04:00

Let's review a bit. The aspis was a dome shaped shield. Domes are supremely suited to transferring force applied to their face around to their base. On a micro-scale this explains why pieces of armor like the Napoleonic cuirasse at right are curved. Because some portion of force applied to a curved face is transferred to the area around it, a curved plate makes stronger armor than a flat plate.

A blow to a curved plate will compress the metal around the site of the impact as in figure A. An impact on a flat or bowl shaped plate, as in B, will stretch the adjoining metal rather than compressing it. Thus only the tensile strength of the metal resists the impact. Compressive strength is always higher in metals than tensile strength.

So on a small scale we can see that curvature helps resist impact. This is probably not a driving force behind the evolution of the aspis because the front of the dome, precisely where we would want this property maximized is flattened.

Once again we must seek a reason for the flattened dome shape.

The aspis rim did not evolve as a shoulder rest

2008-02-29T10:21:00.012-05:00

There was a comment to my last post from a fellow I know and who's opinion I respect. Rather than address it as a comment, I'm going to expand it into a post. He stated:

"One criticism: you leave out the obvious advantage of supporting a shield on your forearm and shoulder or neck- that it reduces the strain on the arm. Clearly its much harder to support a 15 lb shield for an hour at the end of your arm than it is to support it close to your body and resting on your shoulder. The Roman scutum shows that this isn't an insurmountable problem,
but it is significant."

This is an advantage. I need to address it specifically because resting the shield on the shoulder has has been put forth by the pro-othismos (pushing match) authors to partially explain why the shield has its characteristic concave shape. Once I am finished presenting my new model for othismos in the next few posts, I will have to deconstruct the current, incorrect pro-othismos arguments. The development of the double-grip as a means of bearing the weight of the shield I will adress in coming posts, because it is tied to the shield's true function, but I'll discuss the idea of the rim as a shoulder-rest.

The apis can be rested on the shoulder. The logic behind citing this as a reason for the concavity and rim is as follows. The aspis is heavy and held in a double-grip that does not allow it to be put down easily, so a rim was added to allow it to be rested on the shoulder. There are problems with this logical progression.

The aspis is heavy, but much of the weight is added by the thickest part of the shield, which is the thickened shoulder section near the edge and the off-set rim. Thus the means of carrying the weight is responsible for a good portion of it.

Throughout Greek history we see many heavy shields. Large Mycenaean shields appear to have aided in carrying this weight by the use of a shoulder-strap or telamon. The smaller, but still robust shields of the later Macedonians is also equipped with a shoulder-strap. Were bearing the weight of a heavy shield the only concern, the use of a simple strap makes far more sense than an unique, heavy shoulder rest rim structure. Resting the shield on the shoulder is surely something hoplites did to bear its weight, but this function arose as a consequence of the heavy, offset rim, not as its source.

As an analogy I put forward the wearing of corinthian helmets pushed back off the face and held in place by its cheek-pieces. In high school we used to wear our football helmets in this way whenever possible because, even with modern ventilation systems, the difference in heat is enormous. No one would suggest that the cheek-pieces evolved in order to be worn in this manner, the protective function to the face and neck is obvious. It is only the fact that the benefit of the aspis' unique shape is not obvious that allows such conjecture.

As an aside there is an excellent reminder of the power of fashion in the design of military equipment. In Italy, magna graecia, we see a type of helmet known as the Italo-corinthian that is designed to look like a corinthian helm worn in this way, but cannot be worn pulled down. There is no functional reason for this, the faux eye-slits surely weaken the structure, but the force of fashion is strong.

The Domed Shield

2008-02-26T09:05:00.021-05:00

The aspis has a number of features that, if not unique, are unique in combination. The shield is round, convex in profile and somewhat dome-shaped, it invariably has a robust, off-set rim, its cross-section appears to be thicker at the outer edges than in the center, a rope runs through rings fixed around the inner shield-face, and is carried on the forearm.

The wearing of a shield on the forearm with a double-grip is not unique, but it is uncommon for an infantry shield. Cavalry gain from having a second hand free to hold reins, and shields that developed out of cavalry shields may retain this feature. Infantry that are expected to bear a two-handed weapon, or peltast skirmishers, who bear javelins in the left hand, will benefit from a double-grip as traditionally seen in the pelta.

It is possible that this was the original explanation for the double-grip in the ancestral aspis, for early hoplites appear to have been armed with two spears: one to throw and one to fight with.

In hand to hand combat there is little to gain from affixing a shield to the forearm and much to lose. A shield on the arm cannot be brought to bear across the body with the facility of a single-grip, one handed shield held. The heavy shield cannot be simply rested on the ground during lulls in combat. It cannot be used as effectively to punch, the forearm shiver being weaker, nor can it hold off a foe at "arms length."

There is an effect of the distance a shield is held from the body which will be familiar to fencers. As shown at left, the increased distance between the shield and body (B) cuts down on the angle of attacks that are able to reach a defender compared to a close-held shield (A). From a protective standpoint The double-grip adds little.

If we look at a cross-section of the aspis, we see that it is somewhat dome shaped and the thickness is greater towards the rim than in the center. This is peculiar in a shield because they are normally thickest in the center, providing maximum protection to the core of the body behind them, and taper towards the edges.

These structural elements were not seen in the world of ancient Greece, though they would be common a few centuries later. They are the elements that make up a load bearing arch, such as the Roman aqueduct at right.

If it is an arch in cross-section, the complete aspis is a dome. A dome is the most efficient shape for bearing weight, and, though not seen in ancient Greek architecture, has been a feature of construction since its discovery.

A dome works by transferring force downwards from the apex of the structure to the substrate on which it stands- the ground in the case of a building. The diagram below shows the process of transferring force.

You can see that to function efficiently the dome needs to be rather steep sided. The aspis was not so convex, its shape is called a "shallow dome". Shallow domes do not work as efficiently to transfer force through the structure. They are likely to collapse in the center, simply popping inside out like a pop-top or an umbrella in the wind. Also, because the much of the force is directed laterally instead of down into the substrate, the edges are likely to split as the material is force outward on all sides. Below are some ways in which a shallow dome fails.

There are ways to support a shallow dome that can counter this tendency. A heavily reinforced rim will keep the edge of the shallow dome from "kicking out" laterally and prevent failure. reinforcement of the inner face of the shallow dome is accomplished by a truss. In architecture this is usually accomplished by steel cable, but it can be a solid metal reinforcement as well. A truss acts by countering some of the lateral force. By connecting two points in the structure with the truss, the pressure on one side forcing outward will pull the truss to counter the outward pressure on the opposite side. By placing a truss at the point of maximal stress, the structure can be reinforced. A truss placed higher towards the apex will aid in this manner and keep the face of the shallow-dome from collapsing inside out. Diagrammatically I show the truss as a cord or band running across the shield, but a truss can also run around the inside of the structure and have the same effect.

The aspis displays these features that allow a shallow-dome to bear maximum weight. The first and most obvious is the robust, and more importantly, off-set rim. The rim is off-set to provide the maximum resistance to the force that would cause the edges to be forced apart. The thick wood is enhanced by the common addition of a metal reinforcement. This add the tensile strength of the metal to the structure as the metal resists being stretched outwards.

As can be seen in the above diagram, the aspis has a zone near the edge where it becomes steep. This area is particularly vulnerable because the change in angle means that it will bear much of the lateral pressure. Not surprisingly it is the thickest section of the shield.

There are two features which are commonly seen in the aspis that may also support the shallow-dome. There are metal bands seen running around the inner surface of many shields in art, and some examples have been excavated. These bands are too narrow to provide protection from penetration, but are firmly affixed to the shield's inner surface and may act as a truss. They can be seen closer to the apex and at the point of maximal stress near the edges.

There is another feature that is seen on almost all hoplite shields. The grip, or antilabe, is a segment of a chord that runs around the inner surface of the shield through rings affixed precisely where we would expect to find a truss and by running loose through rings would share tension across the shield. The function of this rope is unknown. Images of men apparently using this rope as a sling to carry the shield exist, but the elaborate system, unique the the aspis, seems over-built for this function alone when we consider that the telamon, shield sling, had been around for centuries. Some images show this rope and a separate sling in place. Against its use as a truss is the fact that it is generally shown slack. It is possible that by the date of the images we have the truss was no longer functional, but a decorative holdover from a past functional truss rendered unneeded by better construction techniques and supplementary reinforcements like those above. Another explanation may stem from the fact that the truss cannot be left under tension or the rope will stretch and loosen. Artists painting from an aspis model in their workshop might simply be painting untightened trusses.

Such rope trusses were not unknown to the ancient Greeks. they are a common feature in ship construction known as upozwmata. They may stretch across the ships beam as shown at left, or run fore and aft to prevent what is known as "hogging", where the ends of a boat droop in relation to the center. This force on the center is analogous to the force on the face of the shallow-domes above. The Latin term for these trusses, tormentum, implied another feature. They cannot be left tight, but must be twisted tight before a ship sails.

In the next post I shall show how the fact that the aspis is a load-bearing structure determines the nature of hoplite combat.

The Curved Shield

2008-02-25T11:55:00.009-05:00

What is the benefit of a curved shield? Shields with curved profiles are common, but there is a wide variety in their profiles and the benefits they convey. As shown in the previous post, Assyrian shields were cone-shaped in profile. The sloped shield-face provides increased protection from penetration in a manner that will be familiar to students of the development of WWII tanks and the advent of "sloped armor." Simply because for any thickness of a plane of armor a diagonal path through it will always be longer than a perpendicular path straight across it, a sloped shield acts as though it were thicker than it actually is when blocking a frontal attack.

Another famously curved shield is the Roman scutum. The example at left is from Dura Europos, the image is from the Yale Art Museum, and clearly shows the hemi-cylindrical shape. As well as the sloped-armor effect, curvature can provide enhanced protection from chopping attacks. This one is a little more complicated, but obvious if we understand how weapons are designed to cut. The whole reason for a fine "edge" on a sword or axe is to transfer the total energy of a thick, heavy weapon to the target through the minimum area of contact. This focusses the force and allows cutting.

With a flat shield, a chopping sword will impact the rim along only a few millimeters of razor-thin edge. The way to avoid this is to try and hold the shield-face parallel to the incoming blade, but this is difficult to do consistently. If the sword strikes along the shield-face instead of impacting the rim, then rather than a few millimeters of edge, much of the length of the sword will strike simultaneously. You might think that this is irrelevant since the edge is sharp, but the total area over which the force is transmitted increases. This is conceptually the same way that even long, narrow skis spread ones weight over the surface of soft snow and allow it to be passed over. As shown below, a curved shield provides less protection than an impact along the whole shield-face, but much more than the rim alone. The true benefit is that you do not need to try and intercept the incoming blow with the flat of the shield, a strike cannot avoid it.

The aspis can benefit from both of these effects, but it is poorly designed to do so. It has a relatively flat face when compared with the Assyrian shield, so much of the face is not appreciably sloped. The curved "shoulders" of the aspis are confined to a narrow band just before the rim, so the benefit is confined to blows striking the edge. The fact that the aspis invariably posseses a robust, often metal sheathed, offset rim make added defense against chopping strikes to the rim a low priority.

The aspis seems to not have been designed to capitalize on protective advantages of a curved shape, so why was it so characteristically curved? In the next post I shall examine the shape of the aspis in detail.

The Aspis

2008-02-24T22:11:00.026-05:00

Last fall I published an article in the magazine Ancient Warfare on the Greek hoplite shield: "The Aspis: Surviving Hoplite Battle." If you have not seen this magazine, follow the link at right and take a look. Things have been quiet around here because I did not want to step on the article by posting too much online. Now I am going to examine the features of the aspis in detail and show how it allowed the Greeks to engage in a form of combat that they taken to an unique extreme. In a prior post (see last August's posts) I refuted the argument, put forward best by Adrian Goldsworthy, that Greek hoplites did not enter a mass pushing match, the othismos. In his paper he said the following which marks a perfect jumping-off point for this post:

“Should it be proved that the othismos really was a contest of massed shoving…It would be necessary to explain how the Greeks were able to fight in this unique way, and why they did so.” (Goldsworthy, A. K.: The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle, War in History 4/1, 1997, 1-26.)

The answer to Goldsworthy’s challenge lies in understanding the hoplite shield. It is often referred to as a hoplon, but the term hoplon can refer to any implement of war. The specific term for shield is aspis and the shield we are concerned with is known as the Argive aspis, although the connection to Argos, either as originator or mass-producer, is unclear.

Before showing what it does, I must describe what it is. In this first post I will discuss its construction and characteristic features. The shield may have originated as early as the late 8th or early 7th century B.C. and survived in nearly identical form for at least three hundred years. Round to slightly oval in outline, normally 80 cm to 1 m in diameter and about approximately 7.5 kg weight, its characteristic features are a convex profile and a robust, offset outer rim.

Nick Sekunda, in his Osprey title on hoplites, describes an Etruscan example in the Museo Gregoriano of the Vatican that appears similar to Greek examples. It was constructed of 20-30 cm poplar wood planks glued together horizontally to form a solid block, then turned on a lathe to form the characteristic shallow dome shape that left the flattened center of the core thinner than the curving outer edges. This shield has a diameter of 82cm, a depth of 10 cm and a 4.5 cm off-set rim reinforced with wooden laminates. The shield’s inner face was usually covered with leather and sometimes highly decorated. The face of the Vatican shield is covered in a seamless 0.5 mm layer of bronze that overlaps the inner face of the rim by 4 cm. This fully bronze-faced front of the shield is commonly portrayed, but archaeological finds show that bronze plating of the rim alone, perhaps with a bronze blazon, was more common.

Shields represented on the 7th century Chigi vase appear to be made of layers of thin wooden laths.

Wicker was another possibility for early shields, and into the classical period bronze shield-rims often display a characteristic Guilloche style that is a stylized woven pattern. This may hearken to a time when the shield itself was woven.

The aspis was supported by a double-grip system. Near the center of the shield’s concave interior was a bronze loop, the porpax, through which the left forearm was placed to bear the weight of the shield. The porpax was secured to the shield’s inner face by long vertical bronze straps. This structure could be one piece or made so that the armband was removable, as the Spartans are said to have done to render their shields unusable to rebellious Helot serfs. A second grip, the antilabe, was for the left hand and was placed near the rim. The grip was a pair of metal staples through which a rope passed that traveled through four or more metal rings spaced around the inside perimeter of the shield.

This peculiar shield’s evolution is not well understood. Round, bronze-faced shields were common in the region prior to its appearance, but these were generally single-grip and did not display the twin features of domed shape and off-set rim. Assyrian infantry (below) carried large, deeply convex shields of bronze, but they had a single, central, grip and were cone-shaped. Urartian bronze shields, which have been excavated at Toprakkale near Lake Van in Anatolia, were domed with offset rims. Their diameter, 77 cm to 1 m, differed little from hoplite shields. These had a triple-grip system that has been interpreted to be a single hand grip and two points of attachment for a neck strap or telamon, but may have influenced Greek design.

In the next post I will discuss the function of this dome-shaped shield.

Later Lacedaimon

2008-02-06T12:40:00.000-05:00

I'm often asked: "What happened to Sparta after her loss of hegemony to the Thebans?" I thought I would post a quick review of later Spartan history.

The Thebans put an end to Spartan Hegemony and "free" the helots of Messenia (those in Laconia remain), sealing the deal with the creation of the city of Megalopolis to block westward movements out of Lacedaimonia. Sparta now consists of Laconian alone, but the governing system is unchanged.

The Spartans decline to join Alexander's merry band. In conjunction with Persian naval elements, they lead an ill-fated war against the Macedonian Hegemony while Alexander is somewhere between Issus and Guagamela. They take over Crete and much of the Peloponnese before meeting the macedonian governor at the "Battle of mice" and losing. Sparta is left essentially unchanged, though humbled once again. Had they won we would remember Alexander the pretty good, conqueror of Anatolia.

In the time of the successors Sparta remains one of the more powerful second-tier states. She loses a battle to Demetrios, but the "besieger" fails to besiege her. Between around 300BC and 250BC she lets her Agoge system falter, becoming more like the rest of greece. Areus in this period is the first Spartan king to put his face on coins in imitation of the other great kings. Sparta is still a source for great mercenary generals in this century.

A notable figure early in the century is Cleonymus, a Spartiate and mercenary who fights for Pyrrus of Epirus to good effect in macedonia. Later as Pyrrus' fortunes wane, he convinces him to besiege the city of Sparta. The Spartan men are off in Crete fighting, presumably earning money, when the attack comes and the Pyrrus is defeated by the old and young men. The men then show up and they chase follow his retreat to Argos where he is killed in street fighting- by an old woman throwing a roof tile!

The most famous Spartan mercenary general hails from this period, when Xanthippus leads a losing Carthaginian army to defeat the invading Romans under Regulus, changing the course of the first Punic war. Hannibal had as a tutor a Lakedaimonian as well, who wrote a now lost history of his wars. The Spartans are interesting in the mid to late 200s BC because a King, Agis, tries to undo all of their social problems by recreating the original Lycurgan system. The plan starts off well, but is sabotaged and Agis is executed. Many disenfranchised greeks in other states looked at this example favorably- their upper classes were not pleased. The Aetolians invade and take huge numbers of helots as slaves, while the Spartans are too disorganized to stop them.

The Achean league under Aratus throw out the Macedonian governor Alexander from the Peloponnese. All of Greece was free of a reeling macedon at this time, it was the last, missed, opportunity for autonomy.

In an odd twist of history, the murdered reformer King Agis' wife married the son of the man who did him in. She or simple political strategy lead him to attempt the same reforms. He, Cleomenes III, is very successful but brutal, casting out the other blood-line of kings and the Ephors and essentially becoming a tyrant (for good, so he says). His program is very popular with the underclasses in other cities and he threatens to topple the Achean league, the power that balances against Sparta. Aratus and the Acheans call in the Macedonians for help at the price of giving up all the gains they made in kicking them out earlier!

Cleomenes builds a large army by raising about 4,000 new Spartan citizens through land reform, by buying mercenaries with subsidies from Ptolemy against Antigonas Doson of Macedon, and by freeing 2,000 Helots who can afford to buy their freedom. They meet at Sellasia on the road to Sparta and after a truly horrific and close battle, Antigonas wins. He makes a show of returning Sparta to its ancestral ways- returning the Ephors after kicking out the tyrant Cleomenes, but Sparta never truly recovers her ancestral ways.

The next few decades are marked by a series of Tyrants who build up armies of mercenaries and freed helots, but they all fall. Phillip V of Macedon romps through Laconia, but like so many before him does not take the city of Sparta. The last, Nabis, who claims kingship through a tie to the long exiled Damaratus who accompanied the Persian invasion, makes sweeping "reforms"- exiling many Spartiates and enfranchising rich helots. In the end he is undone by his own Aetolian mercenaries.

Sparta's independant hsitory ends here at the hands of a fellow greek, Philipoemen who "frees" Sparta from tyrrany and this time force her to become a member of the Achean league after recalling the exiles and kicking out the new helot citizens (selling many into slavery). Eventually the Romans step in, but they confirm Sparta as a member of the Achean league.

Sparta flourishes under the Romans, with a number of senators coming from her citizens. She also becomes a bit of a farce, a theme park for rich romans to pretend to enjoy what the ancient Sparta was. A Spartan admiral, Eurycles, son of a Kytherian pirate, on the side of Octavius chases Cleopatra and Anthony's ship and their treasure ship after Actium. Although Eurycles makes a great show of confronting Anthony across the bows, for Anthony had his pirate father killed, in the end these spartans, unlike their forefathers, opt to take the treasure ship. Eurycles becomes a roman citizen and de facto leader of Sparta, whose boundaries are altered by Agustus. He seems to have gone on some sort of mission to Judea and intrigued there with Herod. He ends up being exiled for a time due to the protests at rome of no less a family than that of Brasidas, but ends his days in honor. His children hold high positions and his grandson is a made a Roman senator.

Sparta is eventually sacked by the Goths in the 4th c AD, with many citizens fleeing south to more remote and mountainous regions of laconia. The peoponnese is heavily settles by Slavic tribes in the early Byzantine period, at least one of which, the Melingi, keeps its tribal identity into the time of the Latin conquest.

Geoffroy de Villehardouin, after the 4th crusade, holds sway over Laconia and builds or rebuilds a series of castles to keep out the slavs and unhappy greeks. (One of these is named Castro Bardounia, sharing the name of your humble web host)

The region later becomes Venetian, then Turkish, though it falls to the turks after Constantinople and for a time the Byzantine nobility flees there. The people of the Mani peninsula in southern Laconia in particular, claim to be spartans and are addressed as such even by leaders even as late as Napoleon- who oddly had as a godfather an expatriate Maniate in Corsica. The revolt from the Turks starts in the Mani, so it could be claimed that the "Spartans" once again defeated the Eastern menace to Greek Independence.

Feel free to comment.

2007-08-15T15:17:00.000-04:00

I'm getting many visits, but few comments. If you have something to add, or believe I am in err, please click on "comments" at the end of the article and write your opinion.

If for some reason this is not working, please let me know.

Goldsworthy's Heresy

2007-08-12T11:46:00.002-04:00

Back in 1997 Adrian Goldsworthy wrote a paper (War in History 4:1 1-26) against the literal interpretation of the othismos as a "gigantic pushing match". Before I critique this paper, I want to say that it was very good work. Looking to battlefield universals like morale and understanding the psychology of men in combat was an admirable way of overcoming the fact that much of our evidence, literal and pictorial, can be interpreted in a contradictory manner. In this paper he does not provide new evidence directly against the othismos-as-scrum beyond what was espoused by Cawkwell, Krentz and others. What he does instead is present two quite compelling alternate explanations for why men would fight in deeply massed ranks if not to add their physical weight to the phalanx's pushing power.

For the first explanation he follows Keegan's lead and examines the role of the rear ranks of a deep phalanx in preventing the the front ranks, the only ones fighting in his spear-fencing only scheme, from breaking away from combat. This idea is undoubtedly correct: men in the rear ranks did keep the men before them from running away. This is in part due to their physical presence as a barrier, but perhaps owes more to the psychological boost gained by the knowledge that your compatriots quite literally "have your back."

I won't spend much effort on this argument, because it is quite weak. The author points to 18th century sergeants armed with anachronistic halberds and spontoons as a means of keeping the men of the battle line from fleeing- in armies that most surely did not push. Now, I am Greek and perhaps blinded by hellenophilia, but I have a hard time believing that, if we assume a 2 rank British line, it takes a rear rank depth of 6, 10, 14, or 48 hoplites to do the job of a single man with a Monty Pythonesque pointed-stick. The argument fails on the very universality from which it springs. Why should the Greeks alone require such a specialized formation to deal with a common problem?

His better argument posits that the depth of the hoplite phalanx is based on the need to move large group of men in an orderly fashion. The basic argument is that a group of men of equal size can more more swiftly and in better order in a column than a line. This argument is a red herring though. Sure, a column of 10 files and 50 ranks will move better than a line of 50 files and 10 ranks. What he fails to address is that his scheme does not provide for deployment. Without deploying from column into line, he is facing the enemy with a 10 man front. It is not true that a column of 10 files and 50 ranks move better than a line of 10 files and 8 ranks. Thus we still need to explain the depth of ranks and for this we are back to his morale argument- or othismos as scrum.

A second part of this argument is based on the fact that as formed men charged the ranks thinned out. He quotes Monteuccoli in his description of how men pull apart in the charge such that the actual number of men who reach the enemy at the same time is a fraction of the former front rank. In this argument Goldsworthy is failed by his understanding of crowd movements. He presents a picture of a column of men becoming "scattered" laterally as they advance. This is not what Monteuccoli was describing and in fact is the opposite of what occurs.

As any group of animals, hoplites included, run in a given direction, the faster/braver individuals pull ahead, while the others fall behind. The scatter occurs along the direction of the advance, not a fanning out sideways. Rather than fanning out, the group actually becomes tighter. The reason for this is the same morale effect that the author invokes elsewhere in his article. As the foremost men outpace those behind, the natural tendency is to move closer to the nearest man. This causes the group to narrow as it lengthens. This tendency is common to all herds.

An interesting outgrowth of this is that we would predict that longer charges will actually make for narrower, deeper fronts if the men break ranks. We would expect the original 8 rank phalanx to be deeper and narrower unless the men kept formation through the charge.

As I mentioned much of his other arguments are taken from earlier authors. The notion that a hoplite could not use his weapons and engage in synaspismos is simply a misunderstanding of how such weapons were used and who the targets were. Yes, you cannot stab underhand at the man in front of you, but you can use the spear in your upraised arm quite effectively to stab beyond the man before you and you can use a short chopping or stabbing sword quite effectively. To learn more about my model of Othismos, you'll have to subscribe to Ancient Warfare magazine and get the third issue.

Freelance at last!

2007-08-07T11:46:00.000-04:00

I recently completed an article for "Ancient Warfare" on the hoplite shield and its application in my counter-reformative model of Othismos. Since it was only 2500 words, I have much I could not fit into the article. In the next few weeks I am going to disect Goldsworthy's 1997 paper and show why his model of othismos is in error. Just to be even I will also demonstrate that while correct in the general concept, Hanson et al. are mistaken in many of the details of how hoplites clashed.

Stay tuned...

Welcome to Hollow Lakedaimon

2007-06-12T13:24:00.000-04:00

For the past few years I have been posting my thoughts on the culture and warfare of ancient greece on a variety of lists. I decided to create this blog to enable me to go into greater depth, and I hope clarity, than I could in that format. I welcome any questions you might have. If I cannot answer them myself I will locate the appropriate resources.

My goal for this blog is to attempt to strip away some of the faulty preconceptions and “common knowledge” that are prevalent about Sparta and ancient greece in general.

Spartan man and youth hunting boar 555 b.c.